Substantial policy effort is devoted to stimulate environmentally friendly technology through regulation and subsidies. Since innovation is a crucial productivity driver, a potential crowding out of inventive efforts in affected firms may increase the cost of regulation. We study the effects of regulation-induced environmental technology on innovation activities for a sample of firms in Germany. We find some evidence for a crowding out of firms' in-house R&D, especially for firms facing financing constraints. Innovation outcomes and investments in innovationrelated fixed assets are not affected. Moreover, subsidy-backed environmental technology does not crowd out R&D.
Introduction
Environmental concerns, in particular concerning pollution and climate change, have triggered numerous policy initiatives aimed at limiting further damage. Although environmental policies are crucial to reduce or even avoid the socio-economic cost of environmental disasters, economic policy is also concerned not to threaten the competitiveness of the business sector. Innovation is widely recognized as an essential driver of such competitiveness (Solow 1957; Griliches 1979; Griliches and Mairesse 1984) . Thus, environmental policy is ideally designed such that it avoids a crowding out of other inventive efforts in regulated firms. In other words, there are opportunity costs that ought to be taken into account, since "[ . . . ] any new environmental R&D that comes at the expense of other R&D investment will dampen the costsavings potential of induced technological change" (Popp and Newell 2012, 980) .
While there is also empirical evidence for price-induced environmental innovation, 2 previous research has stressed the efficacy of policy measures for inducing green technological change: "In general, policy, rather than prices, appears to be the main driver of innovation in these technologies" (Johnstone, Hašcic, and Popp 2010, 146) . 3 While environmental regulation may be very effective in achieving the goal of environmental protection, a crowding out of other inventive efforts may question the premise of cost-free controls and may result in competitiveness losses at the firm, industry and national level. Despite the policy relevance of these considerations, there are few empirical research studies on potential side effects, especially at the firm level. Although Lanjouw and Mody (1996) find that environmental regulation stimulates patent applications in green technologies, they cannot rule out a crowding out effect, i.e., that regulated firms would have been even more innovative in the absence of regulation. Gray and Shadbegian (1998) , on the other hand, test for a crowding out effect of pollution control spending on conventional (i.e., other) investments in the pulp and paper sector. They find that a Dollar spent on abatement investments reduces any other investment spending by 1.88 Dollars. Similarly, Roediger-Schluga (2003) uses firm-level survey data to study how the introduction of volatile organic compound emission standards affected competitiveness in a small sample of Austrian manufacturers and whether compliance-stimulated investments crowded out other, more productive R&D. He finds neither unequivocally negative nor positive effects on the competitiveness of manufacturers of regulated products. He concludes, however, that some "firms devoted almost their entire R&D budget to developing compliant products", which suggests that-at least for a certain period of time-compliance efforts displaced or postponed other R&D projects. Popp and Newell (2012) , who study whether new energy R&D crowds out other types of R&D spending, is another notable exception. First, they analyze the effects of economywide increases in energy R&D on total R&D spending at the industry level and find little evidence of crowding out across sectors. Second, at the firm level, they use patent data to examine changes in the research portfolios of companies engaged in alternative energy R&D and find that green patenting does crowd out other types of patenting. Yet, their results also suggest a higher value of the former types of patents, as alternative energy patents are cited more frequently. Since the sample of firms in Popp and Newell (2012) consists of large, publicly traded and patent-active firms, no conclusions can be drawn for small-and mediumsized firms, which are more likely to be affected by financing constraints for R&D. 4 Especially in financially constrained firms, resources allocated to environmental technology reduce available funding for other innovation projects. If firms have to reallocate financial resources to compliance efforts in response to standards and regulations, research budgets, especially of long-term research projects in non-environmental-related areas, may 2 For instance, Newell, Jaffe and Stavins (1999) find that increasing energy prices are associated with new energysaving technology for air conditioners and Popp (2002) observes patent applications for energy-saving technologies to respond to increasing energy prices. 3 See Jaffe, Newell and Stavins (2002) for a review of the literature. Rennings and Rexhä user (2011) provide an overview of policies in place in Germany since the 1960s. 4 See, for instance, for empirical evidence for Germany. They show that financial constraints for R&D decrease monotonically with firm size, while this is not the case for investments in physical assets for which financial constraints are less binding. be scaled down. Thus, although environmental technologies are socially valuable, a crowding out of other fundamental R&D may dampen the social benefits of environmental regulation. When implementing environmental regulation that aims to stimulate environmental technology at the firm level, it seems therefore crucial to consider potential sources of funding for such activities. Fischer and Newell (2004) compare R&D subsidies and other policies aimed at reducing carbon emissions in the U.S. electricity sector and conclude that R&D subsidies are the least effective policy tool for reducing emissions. Yet, they do not consider social returns from knowledge spillovers that justify R&D subsidies, and do not take into account the use of a policy mix in which subsidies are only part of the policy spectrum.
Other studies focus on the industry or national level. Jaffe and Palmer (1997) find ambiguous evidence for regulation-induced innovation at the industry level. More precisely, they show pollution abatement costs expenditure (PACE) as a proxy for regulatory stringency to have no significant impact on patent applications, indicating a redirection rather than a crowding out of patents. On the other hand, they find a positive impact of PACE on firms' R&D expenditures. Similarly, Brunnermeier and Cohen (2003) find PACE to have a significant positive impact on firms' overall patent applications.
Reasons for the lack of empirical evidence at the firm level may include measurement problems because of insufficiently disaggregated data and difficulties in distinguishing regulation-induced and other innovative activities. The following study aims to address these issues. First, the survey-based data has the advantage that we can identify firms that, as a reaction to the policy in place, implemented some sort of environmental technology. Such technologies comprise, for instance, ways to reduce energy and material consumption or waste, improved recycling methods and measures to limit air, soil and water pollution. In other words, rather than using a proxy for the stringency of environmental regulation, we derive indicators from a survey that allow us to identify directly whether regulation has indeed led to investment in compliance technology in a particular firm. Investment in compliance technology also covers cases where firms implement environmental technology developed by others. Taking environmental technology adoption into account is vital, as the diffusion of environmental technology strongly depends on the adoption of existing technologies (Jaffe and Stavins 1995; Jaffe et al. 2002) . Although technology development (rather than adoption) is highly resource intensive and hence likely to crowd out other R&D, the acquisition and implementation of compliance technologies also requires significant human and financial resources. New technologies not only need to be acquired, but must be incorporated into production processes, requiring adjustment to and alignment with existing technologies. Say, for instance, a new ballast water regulation requires logistics companies to install new filters for ballast water into each vessel of their fleets. The acquisition and installation cost of ballast water treatment technology will be substantial. According to estimates by King et al. (2012) , depending on the technology used, such cleansing units may cost up to $1.8 million per vessel.
Additionally, new technologies usually require training of employees and may involve substantial operating and maintenance costs. 5 In the following, we therefore explicitly account for the fact that the cost of compliance, which defines the impact of the environmental regulation on a firm's budget, is highly firm specific.
Regulation and Environmental Technology
There is a considerable body of theoretical research on the impact of regulation on environmental technology and on the effects of different regulatory instruments such as tradable permits, taxes or standards on the R&D incentives for pollution control technologies. 6 Less theoretical work addresses the trade-off between pollution control and productive innovation investments. Magat (1978) models a profit-maximizing firm subject to pollution control regulation that has to allocate a fixed R&D budget over productive and compliance technologies. In other words, there is a tradeoff between R&D to improve productivity and R&D for pollution abatement. He considers two types of regulations in this dynamic model: a pollution tax with a tax rate that is constant over time and an emission standard that sets the maximal amount of pollution a firm may emit. Magat (1978) concludes that a constant tax rate provides decreasing incentives for compliance spending over time and therefore provides more incentives for investment into productive R&D. Roughly speaking, this is because a constant tax rate leads to a decreasing stringency over time as technical progress in pollution control technologies lowers compliance costs. Eventually, this lowers the relative profitability of allocating R&D to pollution control compared to investments in productive R&D, i.e., reducing the extent to which crowding out may occur. For a fixed emission standard, however, the result differs. A firm that allocates R&D to pollution abatement to meet the standard should have no incentive to invest further once it meets the regulatory requirements. However, in a dynamic model in which firms grow over time, firms need to continuously allocate a budget to pollution control to meet the standard. 7 The emission standard may thus crowd out productive R&D while a constant tax does not. The extent to which crowding out occurs may thus depend crucially on the policy design.
Environmental Regulation in Germany.
In Germany, the number of regulations in force has increased substantially over the past decades ( Figure A1 in the Appendix). Importantly, an overwhelming portion of these laws and directives are command-and-control regulations (Frondel et al. 2007 ). This is strongly reflected in the firm survey used for the present analysis. 8 The majority (95.76 per cent) of firms reported command-and-control regulations as reasons for their investment in environmental technology between 2006 and 2008. The most frequently mentioned law is the German equivalent of the 1970 US Clean Air Act, the so-called Federal Pollution Control Act (Bundesimmissionsschutzgesetz), which 6 Popp et al. (2009) review much of this literature. 7 Please note that the results of Magat (1978) crucially depend on the degree of labor substitutability between production and pollution control. 8 Note that only a fraction of the firms (377 completed responses) that adopted pollution control technology responded to the survey question of what specific regulation(s) or law(s) required adoption of abatement technology. These answers, nevertheless, provide an indication of those regulations that initiated green innovations in the firms that we study in detail below. came into force in 1974 and is the most important German regulation to restrict air pollution. Together with its administrative provision, the "TA Luft" (Technical Instructions on Air Quality Control) that sets emission limits, the German Federal Pollution Control Act accounts for approximately 24 per cent of the responses in our survey. At first glance, it seems surprising that rather ancient regulations still provide any incentives for compliance investment today. However, most of these regulations such as the Federal Pollution Control Act have a dynamic character that requires firms to operate the current state-of-the-art abatement technology. Also of high importance were two relatively new regulations that restrict the use of hazardous chemicals. The RoHS directive ("Restriction of Hazardous Substances" enforced in 2006) of the European Community restricts the use of lead, cadmium, mercury and some other metals in electronic devices and initiated compliance efforts in 14.85 per cent of the firms in our sample. Moreover, 11.41 per cent of the firms report that the REACH directive ("Registration, Evaluation, Authorization and Restriction of Chemicals" that came into force in 2007) was the reason for environmental technological investment. Another 8.48 per cent mentioned the Energy Saving Regulation (EnEV) from 2002 and revised in 2007. It sets energy efficiency requirements for buildings, especially for new ones.
In total, more than 40 different command-and-control regulations were named by firms as drivers of environmental technology investment. Almost all of them were revised or augmented in the sample period of 2006-2008, or shortly before. Only in 1.86 per cent of all responses, firms stated market-based regulations or energy taxes as the reasons for technological change. 9 The cited market-based regulation is the European Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) for greenhouse gases that came into force in 2005. To further check for the relevance of market-based instruments for firms in our sample, we linked the firm-level database to the Community Independent Transaction Log (CITL) that reports every single firm covered by the EU ETS. In our data, however, only 1.22 per cent of the firms were identified to be subject to this cap and trade system. This confirms that firms in our sample are mainly affected by command-and-control regulations.
The predominance of command-and-control regulations and the theoretical considerations by Magat (1978) provide the motivation for the following analysis. In particular, it aims at testing whether and to what extent a crowding out of innovation activities occurs due to compliance spending.
Identification Strategy
We consider the introduction of an environmental technology due to regulation as the observed "treatment". 10 Our research question can be illustrated by an equation describing the average treatment effect on the treated firms
where Y T is an outcome variable 11 and the status R indicates the group: R ¼ 1 is the 9 The remaining percentages account for the ISO 14001 standard or other voluntary agreements mentioned as reasons. 10 See Section 4.1 for more details on the definition of the treatment indicators. 11 See Section 4.2 for details on the outcome variables.
380 H. Hottenrott & S. Rexhä user treatment group and R ¼ 0 the non-treated firms. Y C is the potential outcome, which would have been realized if the treatment group (R ¼ 1) had not been treated. While E ðY T jR ¼ 1Þ is directly observable, this is not the case for E ðY C jR ¼ 1Þ. However, as the probability of effective regulation is not random E ðY C jR ¼ 1Þ -EðY C jR ¼ 0Þ, a potential selection bias may arise so that the counterfactual situation cannot be simply approximated by the average outcome of the non-regulated firms. 12 The same applies to the receipt of a subsidy. Thus, we have to take into account that not all firms are affected by regulation and not all firms received a subsidy for their environmental technology. The conditional independence assumption (CIA) Rubin (1977) helps overcome this selection problem. That is, regulation-induced environmental technology investment and the outcome variable of interest (e.g., R&D spending) are statistically independent for firms with the same set of exogenous characteristics X. The result of the matching approach is such that the potential "untreated outcome" of treated firms is constructed from a control group of firms that did not react to environmental regulation by introducing some form of environmental technology. Hence, the matching allows comparing the outcome of treated firms to the hypothetical outcome of these firms if they were not treated. Differences in the outcome variable between these "groups" are then attributed to the treatment. Consequently, if the CIA holds, it follows that
Thus, the average treatment effect on the treated firms can be written as:
In the following analysis, we employ several matching techniques that all have the advantage not to require assumptions about functional forms and error term distributions. 13 Additionally, and in order to test the robustness of the results to a possible violation of the CIA, we estimate instrumental variables models in which we account for endogeneity in the relationship between the outcome variable and the treatment. 14 First and as a benchmark, we perform a nearest neighbor (NN) propensity score matching. We pair each firm that implemented a regulation-induced environmental technology with the single closest non-regulation-affected firm. Thus, for each treated firm, we search for twins in the "potential control group" that share the same characteristics X as the treated firms. The pairs are matched based on the similarity in the estimated probability of having introduced a compliance technology due to regulatory pressure. Matching on the propensity score has the advantage not to run into the "curse 12 For surveys of econometric techniques addressing selection bias, see Heckman, Lalonde, and Smith (1999) or Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) . 13 For discussions and applications of matching estimators, see, e.g., Angrist (1998) , Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997) and Heckman et al. (1998) , Dehejia and Wahba (1999) , and Smith and Todd (2005) . 14 See Section 6 for the details.
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Finally, the average effect on the treated firms can be calculated as the mean difference in the outcome variable(s) of the matched samples. We conduct t-tests on difference in means in the outcome variable(s) after the matching. A significant difference in means may then be attributed to the treatment. In our case, a smaller mean of the outcome variable, like non-environmental R&D in the group of regulated firms, would indicate crowding out due to the regulation-induced environmental innovation. 15
Data
The main data stem from the 2009 wave of the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP) that provides information for the years 2006-2008. The MIP is the German part of the European-wide Community Innovation Surveys (CIS). The survey is conducted annually by the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW), the infas (Institut fü r angewandte Sozialwissenschaft) and the ISI Fraunhofer Institute on behalf of the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research. The target population covers all firms with at least five employees in the German business sector. 16 Besides information on innovative activities and general characteristics of the firms, the 2009 wave of the survey collected detailed information on the adoption and production of environmental technologies. From this core data-set, we are able to identify firms that adopted or implemented some form of environmental technology. This information helped to conduct a second survey among these firms via computer-aided telephone interviews (CATI). 17 This additional telephone survey collected more details on the respective environmental technologies. The most important information drawn from these telephone interviews relates to the cost of introducing and implementing the environmental technology. The response rate of the CATI was 78 per cent.
We further complement the survey data with information on the firms' patent applications at the European Patent Office (EPO) and market concentration data from the German Monopoly Commission. Finally, we obtain a credit rating index for each firm from Creditreform, Germany's largest credit rating agency. 18 After correction for outliers 19 and 15 It should be noted that, since we perform sampling with replacement to estimate the counterfactual situation, an ordinary t-statistic on mean differences is biased as it does not take the possibility of repeated observations into account. We therefore follow Lechner (2001) and calculate an asymptotic approximation of the standard errors that corrects for this bias. 16 A detailed description of the survey data and the sampling method can be found in the background reports available at ZEW. 17 The telephone interviews have been conducted by infas during spring 2010 by 112 different interviewers. Interview partners in the firms were selected based on the respondent information provided in the CIS. Infas contacted 2,986 firms and obtained 1,255 complete answers for the main variable of interest for this study. 18 See Czarnitzki, Hottenrott, and Thorwarth (2011) for a more detailed description of the construction of this index. 19 The data have been checked for consistency and potential response errors using a harmonized method that is applied to all waves of the CIS in Germany. Additionally, we checked for outliers in our main variables of interest and dropped observation from the data-set if the value exceeded the largest percentile of the distribution. the elimination of incomplete records, the final sample consists of 2,521 firm-level observations.
The Treatment
Firms indicated whether they had introduced some form of technology or production process with beneficial effects for the environment and if so, the initiation factors. In particular, firms indicated if regulation, expectations about future regulation, public subsidies or, alternatively, customer demand and/or voluntary agreements at the sector level, initiated the investment. We consider a firm to be treated if it introduced a new technology due to regulation (REG), but not due to customer demand for greener technologies or voluntary agreements. The treatment variable thus takes the value one only if regulations had induced the investment. Yet, we exclude firms from the group of the REG-treated firms if it received subsidies for green technology of any type. For these firms, we define a separate treatment variable (SUB) that takes the value one if the receipt of a subsidy induced the introduction of environmental technology. It should be noted that the two treatments exclude each other, i.e., there is no overlap between the groups. The control group consists of 2,177 firms that fall in neither of the two treatment categories, i.e., did not introduce environmental technology as a response to regulation or a subsidy. 20 The ratio of treated to non-treated firms is favorable for a matching approach for both treatment indicators as the potential control group is sufficiently large. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for these treatment variables. For each of these treatments, we will estimate the treatment effect on the outcome variables.
Outcome Variables
Based on information from the CIS and the telephone survey, we derive innovation input and output variables on which crowding out due to policy-induced environmental technology may occur. The first is the total number of innovation projects in the period of 2006 -2008 . A firm that has to devote a substantial effort to fulfilling regulatory requirements may scale down its overall innovation activity by reducing the number of projects that are ongoing at the same time as the compliance project. Second, we study potential input crowding out, i.e., reduced total innovation-related spending (INNO_TOTAL), which includes internal R&D (INNO_R&D), external R&D as well as innovation-related investment in physical capital (INNO_INV). Such investments usually provide important complementary assets to the intangible knowledge created by R&D.
However, the information on innovation spending does not correct for the fact that firms may have counted regulation-induced investment as innovation spending. In that case, we would underestimate a potential crowding out when looking at innovation spending as an outcome variable. To take that into account, we use information from the telephone survey on the expenses related to the introduction of the environmental innovation. Thus, we can deduct this amount from the total innovation spending (INNO_TOTAL) and obtain the net innovation spending for innovation (INNO_NET) . Note that the expenditures are equal to zero if no environmental innovation had been implemented. 21 On average, firms with positive spending invested about 401 thousand euros on their environmental innovation. The median, however, is much lower with about 50 thousand euros.
Moreover, we derive three measures for innovation output. If compliance efforts were completed during the period of 2006-2008, innovation output rather than input may be affected as a result of displaced or postponed R&D efforts before the survey period. The first captures whether the firm had successfully introduced a product innovation to the market (PRODUCT_INNO) and the second if the introduction of a new product was planned in the 2 years 2009 and 2010 following the survey (PRODUCT_LEAD). Another measure accounts for the possibility of unsuccessful project outcomes, i.e., it takes the value of one if the firm indicated that it had abandoned an innovation project after it had already started (INNO_FAIL).
We argued before that firms may rather scale down investment in areas that are not directly related to current production, but are rather long-term oriented and less certain in terms of returns like R&D. Thus, for comparison, we include the firms' investment in noninnovation-related assets (INV) as an outcome variable. Table 2 presents summary statistics for the outcome variables. Firms have more than seven ongoing innovation projects on average. The median number, however, is much smaller with only one current project per firm. In-house R&D expenditures amount to about 367 thousand euros on average and innovation-specific physical investment is about 358 thousand euros. Total innovation expenditure amounts to about 908 thousand euros and total innovation expenditure net of all costs due to the environmental technology development or adoption is 744 thousand euros, on average. Non-innovation investment amounts to 2.5 million, on average. Forty-five per cent of the firms had some form of product innovation during the survey period and 43.6 per cent had product innovations in the pipeline. Five per cent of the firms had abandoned innovation projects. 
Control Variables
A set of control variables is defined for inclusion in the first-stage probit model in which we model the selection into the treatment. In particular, we include the firms' value of fixed assets (logCAP), as more capital-intensive (as measured by the ratio of fixed assets to sales) firms may be more likely to be subject to environmental regulation (Cole and Elliot 2005) . For similar reasons, we control for firm size by including the number of employees (logLAB). Furthermore, we include the logged value of the firms' expenses on material and energy used in the production process (logMAT) as more material and energy-intensive firms may have higher incentives to introduce technology that reduces consumption in these input factors (Berndt and Wood 1975) and they may be more likely to be affected by regulation (Baylis et al. 1998 ). The age of the firms is included (logAGE) to account for the fact that older firms may be more likely to have to renew part of their production capital, which may make them more likely to make their production more environmentally friendly when replacing their superannuated assets. The firms' labor productivity (LABPRO) measured as sales per employee is included to account for the firms' overall relative productivity. The firms' competitive environment is accounted for by including the Hirschman -Herfindahl measure of sales concentration (HHI). 22 We further include a dummy to control for whether the firm is continuously R&D active (d_R&D) and whether it is a producer or supplier of environmental technology (ECOPROD). The latter control especially addresses the concern that environmental R&D may also be spent by firms to develop new, e.g., energy-saving, products or pollution control technologies to be sold to other companies. That is, we want to control for the fact that producing such environmental technology may be the core business of some firms. The firms' patent stock (PATSTOCK) is included to control for the firms' technological capabilities. As argued earlier, compliance cost may be firm specific since the cost of implementation like training of employees may depend on a firm's absorptive capacity-a concept first introduced by Cohen and Levinthal (1990) . We calculate the firms' patent stock as a perpetual inventory of patent applications with a constant depreciation rate of 15 per cent, as is common in the literature (Griliches and 
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Mairesse 1984). We also account for the fact whether the firm is part of an enterprise group (GROUP). Additionally, we control for structural differences between Eastern and Western Germany that may affect the likelihood to react to regulatory pressure. Firms located in Eastern Germany (EAST) may show differences due to historical developments and due to extensive general subsidy programs to foster innovation in Eastern Germany (see for instance Czarnitzki 2006) . Finally, we distinguish 17 different sectors. Table A1 in the Appendix shows the distribution of firms over these sectors. Table 3 presents summary statistics for the outcome and control variables distinguishing between treated and non-treated firms. Several means of the control variables are significantly different, but vary slightly with the definition of the treatment. For instance, regulation-affected firms are on average larger and are active in more concentrated industries. Further, they are more often part of a group and have a slightly lower labor productivity. Interestingly, if the treatment is defined based on a subsidy receipt, treated firms are more likely to be located in Eastern Germany and more likely to conduct R&D on a continuous basis. With respect to the outcome variables, we also see some significant differences. However, as argued above, it would be invalid to conclude that these differences were due to compliance efforts. Similarly, the higher average investment in innovation-related physical assets and other non-innovation related investment in the group of subsidized firms does not necessarily mean that the subsidy caused this higher investment.
Descriptive Statistics

Econometric Results
Probit Models on the Selection into Treatment
In order to apply the matching estimator, we first estimate a probit model to obtain the predicted probability of having introduced a policy-induced environmental technology. We estimate two different specifications, that is, one for each definition of the treatment. Table 4 presents the results from this exercise. We find larger firms and more material and energy-intensive firms to be more likely to introduce regulation-induced environmental technology. Firm age and labor productivity are negatively associated with regulationinduced environmental innovations, while producers of environmental technologies are more likely to be selected into the treatment REG. Larger firms in terms of employees and continuously R&D-active firms are more likely to have introduced a subsidy-supported environmental technology. Firms in Eastern Germany are more likely to introduce an environmental innovation initiated by a subsidy. Group membership is positively significant in model 1, but not in model 2. Finally, it turns out that the industry dummies are jointly significant for the selection into both treatments. Table 5 shows the results of the NN matching. All control variables are well balanced after the matching so that we can conclude that the matching was successful in the sense that a Policy-Induced Environmental Technology 387 suitable NN was found for each treated firm. The only variables for which there is a significant difference in means after the matching are some of the outcome variables. The results for the treatment (REG) are presented on the left-hand side of Table 5 . Mean values for INNO_R&D and INNO_INV are significantly lower for treated firms. This also translated into a significant overall innovation spending and particularly net innovation spending (INNO_NET). The magnitude of crowding out, that is the average treatment effect on the treated firms (ATT), is the difference between the means. The ATT is higher for R&D than for physical innovation investments and amounts to about 617 thousand euros. Regulationaffected firms thus spend significantly less on internal R&D than their matched control group. For the total innovation expenditure, this difference amounts to 833 thousand euros in the respective year, on average. For the adjusted INNO_NET, the ATT is slightly larger (about 978 thousand euros) which is considerably more than the average cost of introducing an environmental technology of 401 thousand euros. These results may thus imply that the average firm in our sample reduced its overall innovation budget by more than the cost directly related to the environmental innovation project. For the number of innovation projects we do not find any significant difference between the groups. This may indicate that firms reduce scale rather than scope of their R&D projects. As expected, investment in noninnovation-related physical assets is not subject to crowding out. For subsidies as the treatment, we no longer find such a crowding out effect, as can be seen on the right-hand side of Table 5 . Although the mean values for several of the outcome variables are higher in the treated group, the difference is not statistically significant once we account for drawing from the control group with replacement. Moreover, it is important to note that we observe Notes: ***,**,* indicate a significance level of 1, 5 and 10 per cent. Control variables (all balanced) are not presented; t-tests of differences in means based on Lechner-adjusted standard errors are presented in parentheses.
The Matching
Policy-Induced Environmental Technology 389 relatively large variation in the size of the treatment effect by industry class ( Table A2 in the Appendix). Largest effects from regulation-induced compliance investment at the industry level are found in the computer, electronic and optical products, and electrical equipment sector as well as in transportation. For SUB, we find that although the ATT was not significant, the variation in treatment effects is even larger and there are large negative as well as large positive sector-level ATT. Firms in the machinery and equipment, repair and installation of machinery and equipment sector have on average large positive effects. Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply, coke and refined petroleum products as well as the wholesale and retail sector, including the repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles and transportation, show relatively large negative effects. Finally, the results change quantitatively, but not qualitatively when we define the control group differently. For instance, allowing the subsidy recipients to be part of the control group for the REGtreatment alters the estimated treatment effect (ATT) for INNO_R&D from 662.124 to 617.599 without reducing the significance level. Similarly, including the regulation-affected firms without a subsidy in the control group does not render the mean difference between the groups statistically significant for any of the outcome variables. Excluding firms that reacted in response to expectations about regulation in the future from the control group result in an only slightly smaller control group 23 and an ATT of 665.588 for the case above.
Sensitivity Analysis
Variation of the Matching Estimator
To test the sensitivity of our results to specific assumptions of our empirical strategy, we perform a series of alternative matching estimators. First, we perform a two-nearest neighbor matching (2NN) to test how sensitive the results are to having selected only one particular firm for comparison. Second, we want to reduce the risk of bad matches that may occur if the closest neighbor is far away by imposing a caliper that limits the maximum propensity score distance. Finally, we perform Kernel matching (KM) that uses weighted averages of all firms in the control group to construct the counterfactual outcome. 24 The major advantage of this approach is that more information is used and a lower variance can be achieved (Heckman et al. 1997; Heckman et al. 1998) . Table 6 compares the ATTs obtained from the NN matching with the results of the 2NN matching, the caliper matching and the KM (Epanechnikov kernel). The caliper is defined such that the largest percentile of the Mahalanobis Distance distribution is dropped from the sample. The estimated ATT varies across these different models. The direction of the effects and their relative magnitude, however, is quite comparable between the different matching approaches. Based on these results, we conclude that the 2NN matching with caliper provides results that are well within the middle of the bandwidth of the range of outcomes. 23 A large fraction of regulation-affected firms (49.96 per cent) also indicated that they had acted in response to expectations about future regulations, while only a small fraction (5.23 per cent) reacted solely in response to expectations. 24 See Smith and Todd (2005) for technical details.
Heterogeneity in the Treatment Effect
We use the results from the 2NN method for testing whether the average treatment effects differ between different groups of firms. Financially constrained firms, for instance, that have limited access to additional financing may face a stronger crowding out compared to firms that can obtain additional funds from external sources. Similarly, the regulatory burden may be comparatively higher for smaller firms. To test these hypotheses, we first calculate the individual treatment effects as the difference between the overall outcome variables of the treated firms and the control firms ( j ¼ 2) as follows:
We then divide the sample into groups, calculate the means of ATT i and perform t-tests on the differences in the ATT between groups. The upper panel in Table 7 shows that the treatment effect on INNO_R&D is significantly larger for small firms with less than 250 employees. These findings are in line with research that found SMEs to be more financially Note: ATT is presented if significant at least at 10 per cent level. Policy-Induced Environmental Technology 391 constrained than larger firms (Czarnitzki 2006; . Similarly, relatively young firms in our sample (younger than the median) show a higher treatment effect for net innovation expenditure. However, the difference is not statistically significant. As a more direct measure for access to financing, we split the sample based on the firms' credit rating. Firms with outstanding credit ratings should be able to raise funds in the financial markets at the best possible interest rates independent of the type of investment project. Indeed, we find that, for firms with a credit rating in the top 25 per cent, that is in the range between 100 and 193 (RATING [ [100, 600] ), the ATT is even positive and significantly different from the negative ATT of firms with worse credit ratings. In other words, we find a negative treatment effect for all firms but those with the best credit ratings in our sample. Table 8 shows the results from a two-stage least squares estimation taking into account the endogeneity of the treatment variables. For instance, management practices may affect both the firm's innovation strategy as well as whether it is subject environmental regulation. A firm's environmental awareness policy and managerial decisions may affect the firm's investment in state-of-the-art production technologies which are, for instance, less polluting or more energy efficient. Bloom et al. (2010) , for instance, suggest that better managed firms are less energy intensive. A similar argument can be made with regard to receiving environmental subsidies. In contrast to the matching approach that relies on the CIA, but no functional form assumptions, the IV approach assumes a linear functional form and requires valid instrumental variables (IV). We construct IV that are correlated with the potentially endogenous variable, but exogenous to the individual firm's innovation activity. For REG, we derive three IV. The first (IV 1_REG) is a regional measure of woodland area per inhabitant at the four-digit regional code, which divides Germany into 101 districts. 25 We would expect industrial density to be lower in areas with a higher woodland area per inhabitant. Firms in such regions should be less likely to be affected by regulation compared with firms in densely populated areas as several environmental laws require stricter environmental specification and regulation in those areas (see for instance the Federal Emission Control Act). The second (IV 2_REG) is the average frequency of regulation-affected firms by size class since some regulations provide "save harbors" for smaller firms. 26 Thereby, we differentiate between Eastern and Western Germany because of the structural differences between the regions. Eastern German firms received more (general) subsidies, hence we would expect them to employ an on-average newer capital stock needing less energy and causing less pollution. The third (IV 3_REG) is measured as the average frequency by industry capturing the fact that some industries are more likely to be affected by regulation than others. As in the previous case, we also distinguish between Eastern and Western Germany. The first IV for SUB is constructed from an average frequency of effective environmental subsidies in a four-digit geographical district (IV 1_SUB). The second IV is a Policy-Induced Environmental Technology 393 measure for the proximity highways (IV 2_SUB). In a region with dense highway infrastructure, we would expect a higher occurrence of subsidies because of agglomeration of firms in these areas. Third, we take the unemployment rate in a four-digit district as an indication of the liquidity of the public sector in that region. The same set of control variables as in the selection equation for the propensity score estimation is included. We limit the presentation of the model results to the outcome variable (INNO_R&D) . The test statistics show that the IV fulfill the commonly used criteria for valid instruments. The instruments are relevant in the first stage (see F-test of joint significance of the excluded instruments in the first stage at the bottom of Table 8 ) and the Hansen J test statistic, i.e., the heteroscedasticity-robust version of the Sargan test, is insignificant. The coefficient of REG is negative and significant in the second stage in line with the matching results. The coefficient of SUB, on the other hand, is positive albeit fails to pass the threshold for being statistically significant at the 10 per cent level. Thus, both models provide results that are in line the matching results.
Instrumental Variable Regressions
Conclusions
The presented analysis set out to complement the few existing studies on the potential crowding out effects of policy-induced environmental technology on firms' innovative activities. Since innovation in general is a crucial driver of economic growth and competitiveness, a potential crowding out of other innovation could be a barrier to competitiveness and economic growth in the long run, adding to the cost of fighting environmental damage. Using different treatment effect models, we estimated the effects of regulation-induced environmental innovation on the firms' non-green innovative activities.
On the one hand, we indeed find some evidence of a crowding out of the firms' R&D and total innovation expenditure net of those costs due to the implementation of environmental technology. Thus, firms may rather scale down investment in areas like R&D that are not directly related to current production, but are more long-term oriented and less certain in terms of returns. While the direction and significance of these findings is robust to the estimation method, the magnitude of the estimated average treatment effects varied according to an average estimate of 432 thousand euros within a bandwidth between 225 and 662 thousand euros. Interestingly, the estimated average reduction in R&D is quite close to the reported annualized cost for the introduced environmental technology of about 401 thousand euros.
On the other hand, we find no such effects on the number of ongoing R&D projects, investments in innovation-related and fixed assets nor on the outcome of innovation projects. Affected firms were not more likely to cancel ongoing projects nor did they report lower expectations regarding the market introduction of new products as compared to the control group. We also observed remarkable differences in the magnitude of the estimated treatment effect between different groups of firms and sectors. Larger firms experience significantly smaller treatment effects and firms with very good credit ratings even show a positive, albeit small, treatment effect, on average. These results point to the conclusion that firms that face financing constraints may have to scale down current R&D because they cannot borrow for the compliance investments. The observed effects may thus be due to short-term budget re-allocation from R&D to compliance efforts. As R&D expenditures are to a large extent spent on researchers' wages and we assume wages to be relatively fixed in the short-term, we can only hypothesize that firms may re-allocate R&D employees' tasks.
For firms with subsidy-induced environmental innovations, no crowding out of nongreen R&D was found. While these results support the idea that a policy mix of marketbased mechanisms, direct financial support and command-and-control regulation may yield the most efficient environmentally beneficial technological advances, they also suggest that the observed effects may be rather short-term and not detrimental for the firms' innovation performance.
However, these results should be interpreted with the study's limitations in mind. The ideal test would require observing firms over time and testing whether regulatory changes induce environmental investments. Additionally, accounting for the public costs associated with the provision of environmental subsidies appears crucial for the evaluation environmental policies (Laurent-Lucchetti and Leach 2011). Following regulatory changes over time would also allow us to test whether changes in regulation during the period of 2006-2008 that induced compliance investment in the firms in our sample were somehow different from changes that occur in other periods. From our point of view, there is no reason to expect the years under study to be special in that regard, but it may be an avenue for future research to explicitly account for periods of "regulatory stringency". Similarly, it would be interesting to test how these results can be generalized to other institutional settings. Germany constitutes a setting in which regulation as well as enforcement is relatively strong. It would therefore be highly desirable to investigate differences between regimes with varying degrees of regulatory stringency. Future research would therefore benefit from panel data observing R&D activities and regulatory changes over a longer period of time, in different institutional settings, and ideally, even at the project level. Such data would permit an assessment of the impact of regulation-induced environmental technology on the long-term innovation performance of product markets and hence on firms' overall competitiveness. In cases of a substantial crowding out of competitiveness-enhancing R&D, one would expect to observe reduced long-term innovation performance at affected firms, especially when competing internationally. We therefore strongly encourage further research that tackles the challenge to study the nature and heterogeneity of environmental regulation, subsidy programs and new technologies. 
